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GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO.: THE WRONG
DECISION, BUT IT IS STILL BUSINESS AS
USUAL IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS*
Kimberly D. Krawiect
I. INTRODUcrION
The national mood in America today can, I believe, accurately be
described as distinctly deregulatory. This trend may have begun in
federal securities law as early as 1976 with Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,' but gained speed in the 1990s. The current deregulatory
fever is clearly reflected in the Republican Contract with America,2 in
the securities reform bills passed this year by both the House and the
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995. The text
has been slightly modified from the original transcript and footnotes have been added.
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tlsa College of Law. B.A. North Caro-
lina State University, Cum Laude (1987); J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, Cum Laude
(1992). Professor Krawiec was a securities specialist with the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell,
New York, New York, until August, 1995.
1. 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs in private actions must show that the defend-
ant acted with scienter in order to succeed in a Rule 10b-5 claim). For a discussion of Rule 10b-5
and the scienter requirement see infra notes 64 and 65.
2. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The "Common Sense Legal Reform Act of
1995," introduced on January 4, 1995, was the legislative embodiment of that portion of the
Republican Contract with America which addressed reform of the tort liability system. Id. Title
I of the Bill related to product liability reform and Title II contained provisions relating to secur-
ities litigation reform. Id. The Bill would have instituted a strict "loser pays" or "English Rule"
requiring the loser to pay the winner's legal fees in all private securities litigation, required ac-
tual knowledge (as opposed to mere recklessness) and actual reliance (ie. elimination of the
"fraud on the market" theory) in all Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, and instituted propor-
tionate liability, class action reforms, and other mechanisms intended to correct perceived
abuses in private securities litigation. Id.
1
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Senate,3 and in a line of cases contracting liability for material mis-
statements in offering documents,4 of which Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.5
is only the most recent decision. Although these reform initiatives
are, no doubt, driven in part by the perception of widespread abuses
in private securities litigation, Gustafson also reflects a recurring
theme of the present Supreme Court discussed by many of the other
speakers today: a renewed concern for federalism principles. Because
this decision can be justified by neither the language of the Securities
Act of 19336 (the "Act") nor on considerations of controlling prece-
dent, Gustafson can only reflect the Court's belief that an excessive
number of plaintiffs who perceive themselves as wronged in a business
transaction seek recourse through the federal securities laws, and that
some of these plaintiffs should be forced to seek their remedy in state
court under traditional contract or corporate law theories.
It has been said that the decisions produced in the 1994-95
Supreme Court Term in the area of corporate and business law are
notable primarily for their unanimity and lack of controversy.7 Gus-
tafson, which held that Section 12(2) of the Act applies only to public
offerings by issuers and an issuer's controlling shareholders,8 is cer-
tainly the exception to that characterization. The controversial five to
four decision is contrary to what had been the prevailing view among
3. On March 8, 1995, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1058, the "Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act," by a vote of 325-99. House Amends and Passes Legislation to Reform Pri-
vate Securities Litigation, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 392 (March 10, 1995) [hereinafter H.R.
1058]. On June 28, 1995, the Senate passed S. 240, the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995," by a vote of 70-29. Id. Subsequent to the date of this symposium, a House-Senate
conference committee approved on November 28, 1995, an amended H.R. 1058. Conferees on
Securities Litigation Approve Bill Despite Strong Opposition, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1831
(Dec. 1, 1995). H.R. 1058 was passed over President Clinton's veto by the Senate on December
22, 1995, by a vote of 68-30, and by the House on December 20, 1995, by a vote of 319-100,
Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now Law, 28 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 5, 1996).
4. See g., Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991)
(holding that there is an absolute three-year statute of limitations on federal securities-fraud
claims by private plaintiffs); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995) (finding un-
constitutional Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which required courts to
reopen cases dismissed as time-barred after June 20, 1991, when Lampfwas decided, but before
the Act became law six months later); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (ruling that there is no aiding and abetting liability in
private actions under Rule 10b-5).
5. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
7. Robin S. Conrad, Business Docket Brings Justices Into Unanimity, Tim NAT'L L. J., July,
31, 1995, at C6.
8. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071.
[Vol. 31:509
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GUSTAFSON v. ALLOYD CO.
commentators and practitioners for many years9 and provoked vigor-
ous dissents from both Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg. In addi-
tion, the division among the Justices is exceptional, with Thomas,
Scalia, Ginsburg and Breyer joining in the dissent - an alliance not
often seen in the Court's decisions.
Section 12(2) of the Act provides that any person who offers or
sells a security, other than a security exempted under Section 3(a)(2)
of the Act,' ° by means of a prospectus or oral communication which
contains a misstatement or omission of a material fact, may be held
liable to the purchaser thereof for recision or damages, subject to an
affirmative defense on the part of the defendant that the exercise of
reasonable care would not have uncovered the misstatement or omis-
sion." Although Section 12(2) would appear by its terms to apply to
any purchase or sale of any security (other than Section 3(a)(2) ex-
empted securities, as previously discussed), there had been, prior to
Gustafson, some division among courts as to the Section's proper
scope. The circuits were divided over the Section's application to sec-
ondary trading, but were unanimous in their belief that Section 12(2)
applied to private placements. A few circuits, for example, along with
several lower courts, had held that the application of Section 12(2) is
limited to "initial offerings" of securities and does not apply to secon-
dary trading. 2 Other circuits and lower courts, however, had reached
the contrary conclusion. 13  All four circuits that had considered the
9. See, eg., 3 Louis Loss, SEcuRrrEs REGULATION 1684 (1961) ("[Section 12(2)] imposes
liability for rescission or damages upon anyone who offers or sells any security, whether or not
registered or exempt from registration, by means of a material misstatement."); HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTIAL, SEcuRrriEs LAW HANDBOOK § 14.05, at 14-46 to 14-73 (1991); 1 THOMAS L.
HAZEN, LAW OF SEcuRrIEs REGULATION § 7.5, at 301-05 (2d ed. 1990); 9 Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4217-22 (3d ed. 1992); Therese H. Maynard, Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933: A Remedy for Fraudulent Postdistribution Trading?, 20 SEC. REo. L.
J. 152 (1992). But see, Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have it Right Securities Act Section 12(2)
Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. LAW. 1 (1992).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994). Securities exempted under Section 3(a)(2) of the Act include
government securities, bank securities, and collective, common or single trust funds. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). This standard of reasonable care is substantially equivalent to
the due diligence defense available to defendants under Section 11 of the Act. E.g., Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981);
Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1977).
12. Balay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 684 (3d Cit. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 820 (1991); First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843 (11th
Cit. 1993); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127,1154-55 (D. Kan. 1992); Budget Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc. v. Hirsch, 810 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
13. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cit. 1993); Me-
tromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993);
PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970,978 (D. Md. 1993); Hedden v. Marinelli, 796
F. Supp. 432, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
1996]
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applicability of Section 12(2) to private offerings by issuers or an is-
suer's controlling shareholders had held that Section 12(2) applied to
such sales.14  The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, however, in
Gustafson.
II. GUSTAFSON V. ALLOYD Co.
Gustafson stemmed from the private sale by shareholders of sub-
stantially all of the outstanding stock of Alloyd Co., Inc. ("Alloyd").' 5
Alloyd Holdings, Inc., a holding company formed for the purpose of
effecting the sale, purchased the Alloyd stock on December 20, 1989,
by means of a stock purchase contract.' 6 No separate private offering
memorandum or other disclosure document was provided to the pur-
chasers.' Because Alloyd's practice, like that of many businesses,
was to take inventory at year end, the parties were forced to rely on
estimates of Alloyd's net worth in determining the purchase price.18
The contract of sale included representations and warranties that the
company's financial statements "present[ed] fairly.., the Company's
financial condition," and provisions were included in the contract of
sale which provided for a post-closing adjustment of the purchase
price in the event of an incorrect estimate.' 9 After the year-end audit
revealed that Alloyd's actual net worth was lower than the estimates
relied upon by the parties in calculating the purchase price, the pur-
chasers sued under Section 12(2) of the Act, seeking recision of the
entire purchase, rather than accepting a payment adjustment accord-
ing to the contract.20 The buyers alleged that the statements made by
the selling shareholders regarding the financial condition of Alloyd
were inaccurate, thus rendering the representations and warranties in
the contract false and misleading.21 The buyers further alleged that
the contract was a "prospectus" as contemplated by Section 12(2) of
the Act, thus giving rise to liability for any material misstatements3 z
14. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. CL 1061, 1082 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See
Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 587; Metromedia, 983 F.2d at 360-61; Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group,
Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990); Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 364-65
(4th Cir. 1986); Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974).
15. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064.
16. Id. at 1064-65.
17. See id. at 1065-66.
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In ruling that the purchase contract was not a "prospectus," the
Court examined both the general structure of the Act and three spe-
cific sections relating to the term "prospectus": Section 10, which sets
forth the information which must be contained in a prospectus; 2 Sec-
tion 12, which imposes liability based on material misstatements or
omissions in a prospectus;24 and Section 2(10), which defines the term
"prospectus."' 2 In interpreting the term "prospectus," the Court em-
phasized that the term should be construed consistently throughout
the Act.26
Beginning its analysis with Section 10, the Court noted that the
term "prospectus" as used in Section 10 is limited to documents that
must include the information contained in a registration statement.27
Because the purchase agreement in question did not, and was not re-
quired to, contain the information contained in a registration state-
ment, the Court reasoned that it could not be a prospectus under
Section 10.28 The Court then noted that, in general, only public offer-
ings of securities by an issuer or an issuer's controlling shareholders
require the preparation and filing of a registration statement.29 It
must follow, therefore, that a prospectus under Section 10 is confined
to documents employed in connection with public offerings by an is-
suer or its controlling shareholders.3 0 Reasoning that "identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning," the Court then held that if the contract under considera-
tion was not a prospectus for purposes of Section 10, it could not be a
prospectus for purposes of Section 12 either.31
Turning next to the general structure of the Act, the Court noted
that the primary purpose of the Act was to create registration and
disclosure obligations in connection with public offerings.3 2 It is thus
much more reasonable, the Court argued, to interpret the liability
provisions of the Act, including Section 12(2), as providing remedies
for violations of obligations imposed by the Act 3 - i.e. obligations in
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
26. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (1995).
27. Id. Section 10 specifies that "a prospectus ... shall contain the information contained in
the registration statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1) (1994).
28. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067.
29. Id.
30. id
31. Id. (quoting Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 843, 845 (1994)).
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connection with public offerings. As support, the Court noted that
Sections 11 and 12(1), the "statutory neighbors of Section 12(2)," af-
ford remedies for violations of these obligations.34
Concluding its analysis, the Court turned to Section 2(10) of the
Act, the definitional section, which defines the term "prospectus" to
include "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any se-
curity for sale or confirms the sale of any security. '35 Rejecting Al-
loyd's argument that inclusion of the words "communication, written
or by radio or television," meant that any written communication of-
fering a security for sale was a prospectus, 6 the Court noted that the
words "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or letter" all refer
to documents of widespread dissemination.37 Similarly, the list in-
cluded communications by radio or television, but not face-to-face or
telephone communications.38 The term "communication" as used in
the list, therefore, must refer to a public communication.39 In other
words, the term "written communication" must be read in context to
refer to writings that are similar to the terms "notice, circular, [and]
advertisement" n0 - i.e. written communications to the public at large
such as those used in a public offering.
III. ANALYSIS
The Gustafson decision violates nearly every rule of statutory
construction and is contrary to sixty years of jurisprudence concerning
which communications constitute a prospectus. A standard rule of
statutory construction is that when construing a legislative term,
courts usually start with the definitional section, moving on to other
sources only when the statutory definition is unclear or ambiguous.4"
The Court ignored this rule and instead turned first to an examination
of Section 10, a substantive provision which was not even at issue in
Gustafson.42 The Court correctly noted that Section 10 gives a narrow
meaning to the word prospectus as the term is used in that section.n3
34. 1I
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
36. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
37. Id. at 1070.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1069-70.
41. See id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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But Section 2(10), the definitional section, contains a very broad defi-
nition of the term prospectus which is to be used throughout the Act
unless the context otherwise requires.44 Clearly, the context of Section
10 requires a different interpretation of the word prospectus. The
context of Section 12(2), however, does not.45 As Justice Ginsburg
persuasively noted in her dissent, the majority reasoned backward:
rather than consulting Section 2(10) to arrive at a definition of pro-
spectus which will then be applied to the substantive provisions, in-
cluding Sections 10 and 12, unless the context otherwise requires, the
Court read into the literally and logically prior definitional section,
Section 2(10), the meaning prospectus has in Section 10.46
Although the Court is correct in its contention that the same
word used in different parts of a statute is generally considered to
have the same meaning throughout, this presumption is not set in
stone and is overcome when Congress clearly intended otherwise, as it
did in drafting the Act.47 As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dis-
sent, the Court ignored one item in Section 2(10)'s list of documents
that constitute a prospectus: any document that "confirms the sale of
any security. '48  Congress obviously did not intend that every confir-
mation slip contain the information required in a Section 10 prospec-
tus.49 The Act, therefore, uses the term "prospectus" in two different
ways. 50 Thomas further pointed out that the dual use of the word
"prospectus" in Section 2(10) itself clearly indicates that Congress was
using the term in two different ways: as a term of art meaning a docu-
ment accompanying a public offering for purposes of Section 10, and
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1994).
45. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
majority transforms § 10 into the tail that wags the 1933 Act dog.").
47. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning .... But the presumption is not
rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the
words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in
different parts of the act with different intent ....
Nations Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 816 (1995).
48. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. See id.
50. Id. Justice Ginsburg also notes that Congress itself, in enacting the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, explicitly recognized that the Act uses "prospectus" in two different senses:
"'Prospectus' as used in [§ 22 of the Investment Company Act], means a written prospectus
intended to meet the requirements of section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ... and cur-
rently in use. As used elsewhere, 'prospectus' means a prospectus as defined in the Securities
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as a much broader term in Section 2(10).51 Analyzed thus, the double
use of the term "prospectus" in Section 2(10) seems logical. For pur-
poses of the Act, unless the context otherwise requires, "prospectus"
means not only those documents which are commonly known as a
prospectus (i.e. those used in public offerings which contain the infor-
mation required by Section 10), but also other letters, communica-
tions, and advertisements which offer a security for sale that are not
normally thought of as a prospectus.
Also, both Ginsburg and Thomas note in their dissents that if
Congress had intended Section 12(2) to apply only to public offerings
by issuers and an issuer's controlling shareholders, it would have
clearly stated such a limitation.52 For example, Section 4(1), 53 which
exempts transactions by any person other than an issuer, dealer, or
underwriter, and Section 4(2), 54 which exempts transactions by an is-
suer not involving any public offering, make clear that Congress knew
how to differentiate issuer public offerings from private placements
and secondary sales.55 Section 12(2)'s explicit exemption only for Sec-
tion 3(a)(2) securities further demonstrates that Congress knew how
to exempt specific securities and transactions from a liability provi-
sion's scope if it so desired.56
Furthermore, an examination of the structure of the Act does
not, as the Court suggests, lead to the inevitable conclusion that Sec-
tion 12(2) applies only to initial public offerings. In fact the Court
explicitly rejected this reasoning in 1979 when it held that Section 17
of the Act is not limited to initial offerings, despite the fact that initial
offerings and not secondary trading are the primary concern of the
Act.57 In rejecting respondent's argument that Section 17(a) did not
apply to his fraud because it took place in the "aftermarket" and not
in an initial public offering, the Court held that the correct interpreta-
tion of Section 17 was made "abundantly clear.., by the statutory
language, which makes no distinctions between the two kinds of trans-
actions."58 This reasoning is equally applicable to Section 12(2). 59
51. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1076-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
55. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979).
58. Id at 778.
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In addition to misinterpreting congressional intent, the Court's
decision in Gustafson is contrary to long-standing judicial and admin-
istrative understanding of the definition of "prospectus," particularly
in connection with "gun jumping" jurisprudence under Section 5(b)(1)
of the Act.60 Following the Gustafson Court's analysis, one should be
able to avoid violations of Section 5(b)(1) simply by refraining from
the transmission of a prospectus (i.e. a document prepared in connec-
tion with a public offering which is required to meet the specifications
of section 10) which does not contain all of the items contemplated by
Section 10. Based on the broad definition of "prospectus" found in
Section 2(10), however, it has always been the position of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission that the transmission of any written,
radio or television communication which offers a security for sale is a
violation of Section 5(b)(1). 61 Even those communications which do
not explicitly offer a security for sale but are deemed to carry a danger
of "conditioning the market," such as documents publicizing the issuer
or the issuer's business, are prohibited as impermissible "prospec-
tuses."'62 Eventually the Court will be called upon to rationalize its
ruling in Gustafson with this body of decisions.
IV. FuTuRE IMPLICATIONS
Gustafson limits the applicability of Section 12(2) to offerings of
securities required to be registered under the Act and to public offer-
ings of securities exempt from registration under Section 3 of the Act
(other than paragraph (a)(2) thereof). Therefore, Section 12(2) liabil-
ity will not attach to material misstatements and omissions made in
connection with private placements and secondary market trades.63
60. Section 5(b)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful "to carry or transmit any prospectus
relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been fied... unless
such prospectus meets the requirements of [Section 10]." 15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(1) (1994). The stage
of registration covered by Section 5(b)(1) is referred to as the "Waiting Period" - that period
after filing but prior to the effectiveness of a registration statement during which the right to
offer securities is severely limited. Impermissible offers during the Waiting Period are thus
termed "gun jumping."
61. Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration State-
ment, Securities Act Release No. 3844, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3252 (Oct. 8,1957). "Thus,....
no written communication offering a security may be transmitted through the mails or in inter-
state commerce other than a prospectus authorized or permitted by the statute or relevant rules
thereunder." Id. at 3258.
62. Id. at 3254. "Nor is it generally understood that the release of publicity and the publi-
cation of information between the filing date and the effective date of a registration statement
may similarly raise a question whether the publicity is not in fact a selling effort by an illegal
means; i.e., other than by means of the statutory prospectus." Id.
63. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1072-73.
1996]
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The question now becomes: what does this mean for you as practicing
attorneys? The implications of Gustafson seem particularly important
in connection with private placements. Prior to Gustafson, we, as
practitioners, had all assumed that Section 12(2) applied to private
placements by an issuer or an issuer's controlling shareholders. As a
result, private placements have been conducted as if Section 12(2) ap-
plied, with due diligence procedures in private placements being sub-
stantially consistent with those in a public offering. After Gustafson,
is there no recourse for those who purchased a security in a private
placement on the basis of fraudulent representations in an offering
document? Should we now advise our clients to no longer waste the
time and money expended in investigating the accuracy and complete-
ness of private offering materials? The answer is: absolutely not.
There are too many other legal and practical considerations which
counsel against a radical change in conduct.
For example, liability for these transactions may still exist under
Rule 10b-5. 64 Although it is more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail
under Rule 10b-5 than under Section 12(2) due to the plaintiff's bur-
den in a Rule 10b-5 action to prove reliance and scienter,65 this addi-
tional hurdle is less significant in developing a policy regarding
disclosure and investigation in unregistered transactions than it may
first appear. The huge expenses which accompany discovery and liti-
gation of this type, coupled with the potential for astronomically high
damages lead to an abnormally high settlement rate in securities class
actions.66 The goal of any good corporate planner, therefore, should
64. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1995). Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part that it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading." Id.
65. Although the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), specifically
declined to address the issue of whether reckless conduct constitutes scienter for purposes of
Rule 10b-5, id. at 193 n.12, those circuit courts which have addressed the issue have held that
intentional or reckless conduct is sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. See, e.g., Van Dyke
v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989) (adopting recklessness standard and
noting that the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have adopted
the recklessness standard); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d 1405, rev'd on other grounds,
910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopting recklessness standard and noting that all of the eight circuit
courts which have considered the issue have adopted the recklessness standard). The duty is on
the plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action to prove scienter. In contrast, Section 12(2) imposes a negli-
gence standard which requires the defendant to show that the exercise of "reasonable care"
would not have uncovered the misstatement or omission. In addition, plaintiffs in a Section
12(2) claim need not show reliance.
66. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). Professor Janet Cooper Alexander conducted a study of
class action litigation brought in the Northern District of California based on high technology
company offerings that occurred during the first six months of 1983. She found that virtually all
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be to avoid an appearance in court to begin with, or, barring that, to
ensure a likely dismissal on summary judgment before the lengthy and
expensive discovery process begins. A court ruling on a summary
judgment motion and presented with evidence sufficient to establish
negligent conduct may be unwilling to conclude that a jury could not
reasonably find recklessness.
In addition, those who offer or sell securities in an unregistered
offering by means of a material misstatement or omission must still
contend with Section 17(a).67 Although most courts have declined to
imply a private right of action for Section 17(a) violations, 68 the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission often proceeds in enforcement ac-
tions under that section.
Also, we, as practitioners, should not forget that in formulating
an investigation and disclosure policy in connection with unregistered
offerings, bases of state law liability must not be overlooked. All
states have enacted some form of state securities or "blue sky" laws,
which are not preempted by federal law69 and are not affected by Gus-
tafson. Most of these laws are patterned after the Uniform Securities
Act,70 which contains language in its Section 410(a)(2) nearly identical
to that of Section 12(2) of the Act.7' It remains to be seen whether
of the cases were settled, with plaintiffs collecting an average of approximately 25% of the face
value of their claim. Id. at 500. This information seems to confirm what many have always
suspected: not only are most securities class actions settled, but the settlement value appears to
bear no relation to the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994). The Supreme Court specifically held in United States v. Nafta-
lin that Section 17(a) is not limited to initial public distributions of Securities. 441 U.S. 768, 778
(1979). The language of Section 17(a) is nearly identical to that of Rule 10b-5, the only differ-
ence being that Section 17(a) applies only to fraud in connection with "the offer or sale of any
securities" and does not extend to purchases of securities as does Rule 10b-5. See id. at 777-78.
In spite of this similarity in language, courts have construed the two provisions differently. In
particular, the Supreme Court has held that while scienter is a necessary element of a cause of
action under Section 17(a)(1), it is not a necessary element under Section 17(a)(2) or (3). Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
68. THOMAS L. HAZEN, TiH LAW OF SECURrTIS REGULATION 364 (3d ed. 1996).
Although the vast majority of courts deny a private remedy under Section 17(a), district courts
in the Second Circuit have held that such a remedy does exist. JAMES D. COX ET A., SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 675-76 (1991).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78bb(a) (1994).
70. UNIw. SEcURrrms Acr, 7B U.L.A. 509 (1956). See HAZEN, supra note 68, at 389 n.3.
71. Section 410(a)(2) states that:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sus-
tain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration
paid for the security, together with interest at six percent per year from the date of
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state courts interpreting the state law provision will be influenced by
the Supreme Court's ruling in Gustafson. Because Section 410(a)(2)
avoids reference to the term "prospectus," however, many state courts
may rule that the decision has no bearing on interpretation of the
state statute.
Finally, we should remember that disappointed purchasers of un-
registered securities may still bring an action for common law fraud.
Sellers may thus continue to be liable for false or misleading state-
ments and omissions regardless of the applicability of state or federal
securities laws. Similarly, bases of contractual liability should be con-
sidered. It is common for private placement purchase contracts to
contain representations and warranties by the issuer as to the absence
of material misstatements and omissions in the selling materials.72 If
this warranty is breached, then contractual liability may be found.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Gustafson ruled that Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act applies only to initial public offerings of securities by an
issuer or an issuer's controlling shareholders - a decision supported
by neither the language of the statute itself nor by controlling prece-
dent. As a result, Section 12(2) liability will no longer attach to mate-
rial misstatements or omissions made in connection with private
placements and secondary market trades. This result is contrary to
long-standing scholarly and judicial understanding of Section 12(2)
and eliminates the most broadly available and stringent federal basis
for recovery by a private plaintiff in an unregistered offering. None-
theless, the decision does not warrant a radical revision of disclosure
and investigation policy in unregistered transactions due to the contin-
ued existence of other legal and practical considerations.
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received
on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.
UNnr. SEcuRrrms Acr, 7B U.L.A. 509, 643 (1956).
72. In fact, the purchase contract at issue in Gustafson contained a similar representation.
Article IV of the purchase agreement, entitled "Representations and Warranties of the Sellers,"
included the statement that the company's financial statements "present fairly ... the Com-
pany's financial condition," and that "there ha[d] been no material adverse change in... [Al.
loyd's] financial condition." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1065 (1995).
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